Abstract. This paper applies game theory and a cost-bene…t analysis to study voluntary exits and contagion e¤ects in countries joined to a monetary union. The paper looks at two non-core, or periphery countries of a large union and examines the role of structural asymmetries and strategic interactions as determinants of equilibrium outcomes, following both country-speci…c and common shocks. The paper …nds that under almost symmetry between countries, countryspeci…c shocks are never associated to multiple equilibria and, if large enough, can spread to other countries leading to contagion. By contrast, common shocks are seen to sustain multiple equilibria if almost-symmetric countries are considered, and to have implications similar to those found in the country-speci…c case if large structural asymmetries are admitted.
Introduction
The dramatic sovereign debt-crisis surge in some European countries following the onset of the global …nancial crash in 2007-08, and the perceived risk of contagion to other EMU countries have been the focus of a number of recent papers analyzing the root causes of the current …nancial turbulence in the Euro Zone (EZ).
Drawing from the sizable literature on exchange rate crises, for example, Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) propose a model of EZ crisis that built around the Obstfeld (1996 )-and Krugman (1998 -style model of currency crises, also known in the literature as second-and third-generation models of crises, respectively.
1 They …nd evidence of contagion to the majority of EMU countries from Greece, and of a striking shift in market pricing behavior from a model applying the same risk premium on government bonds of all EMU countries before 2007, despite intra-European imbalances, to one applying huge spreads thereafter, to re ‡ect both currency risk and default risk on a country-by-country basis.
2
Making use of a second-generation approach, De Grauwe (2012a) and
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) provide a self-ful…lling theoretical explanation of sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Zone. They argue that because members of a monetary union issue debt in a currency over which they have no control (i.e., they are borrowing in a 'foreign'currency), government bond markets are fatally exposed to self-ful…lling liquidity crises that can degenerate into 1 A comprehensive and detailed analytical discussion of the existing theoretical literature on currency and …nancial crises is to be found in Piersanti (2012) . 2 Similar results are found, e.g., in Schuknecht et al. (2011) , Gibson et al. (2012) , Borgy et al. (2012), De Grauwe and Ji (2013) , Favero (2013) , Canofari et al. (2014b) . Evidence of contagion e¤ects from Greece, Ireland and Portugal to other Euro Zone countries are also given, e.g., in Arezki et al. (2011) , Metiu (2012) , and De Sanctis (2014).
a solvency crisis through unsustainable rise in the interest rates and deep recessions. In addition, as in a currency union …nancial markets become more and more integrated, spillover e¤ects and contagion from a 'ground-zero' country (the …rst country to undergo a crisis) to other Euro Zone countries are more likely to take place.
Combining the features of both …rst and second generation approaches, Canofari et al. (2014a,b) advance a simple theoretical framework of speculative attacks and crisis in currency unions that includes the main channels for contagion across member countries. They derive a sustainability index for countries operating in hard peg regimes (such as currency unions, currency boards or full dollarization) that builds on cost bene…t analysis. The index exploits the relationship between the shadow exchange rate and the output gap required to remain in a hard monetary system, and the model implies that a monetary union is viable when the index shows the capability of the member countries to remain in the hard peg arrangement. This is possible as long as the divergence between the costs of staying relative to the bene…ts does not exceed a threshold value.
By applying their index to EZ countries in order to evaluate the sustainability of the Euro after the global …nancial crisis, Canofari et al. (2014) show that tensions do exist, particularly for Greece and Portugal who show a severe loss of competitiveness against Germany. However, these tensions appear not so far of such entity as to necessarily cause a breakdown of the common currency, although self-ful…lling speculative attacks, starting in countries with weaker fundamentals, might well take place if the EZ governments failed to send clear signals indicating their strong political willingness to sustain the common currency. Should this uncertain scenario persist, Canofari et al. (2014a) also predicts that the survival of the Euro might be seriously threatened through the spillover and contagion e¤ects that would inevitably trigger among EZ markets and countries.
This paper extends Canofari et al. (2014) 
The basic model
Our model describes an asymmetric three-country monetary union consisting of a core or leader country and two small periphery economies or non-core countries (A and B). 4 In order to focus on contagion phenomena in the periphery, we abstract from possible interactions between the core and non-core countries, letting policy decisions in the periphery have little or no impact 3 Woo and Vamvakidis (2012) use a similar approach to provide a ranking of countries having the most incentive to exit the euro area. 4 The basic setup builds around Canofari et al. (2014) to which we refer for more details. For a similar approach, see also Masson (1999) , Buiter et al. (2001), and Berger and Wagner (2005) .
on the core. 5 We also take intra-trade between the two small peripheral countries to be negligible, assuming that most of trade occur with the core.
Each economy produces only one good and these goods are imperfect substitutes for one another. Output is a function of the real wage and nominal rigidities exist in the form of a one period wage contract. For simplicity, we let the union-wide in ‡ation rate be equal to zero.
Measuring all variables in logs, we can describe the basic model by the following equations.
The aggregate supply for country i is
where y i t is date t output,ỹ i is the worker's output desired level, s i t is the (shadow) nominal exchange rate for country i at time t, and s i the relative entry currency parity. 6 The nominal exchange rate is de…ned as the price of the union common currency in terms of the local currency of country i.
The international demand for the goods produced in country i, d i t , depends on the real e¤ective exchange rate, q i t :
where u i t is an i.i.d. random shock described by a continuous, bell-shaped and symmetric (around zero) probability density function. 5 This assumption is meant to capture gaming aspects of real world monetary unions (e.g. EMU) where a leader country or a "core" can impose its rules on the whole system.
See, e.g., De Grauwe (2012b). 6 The shadow exchange rate is here the ‡oating rate that would prevail at any date t in country i conditional on exit from the monetary union. The key role this variable plays in the theory of exchange rate crises is described in Piersanti (2012) .
Assuming that prices are …xed for simplicity, the real e¤ective exchange rate in country i can be written as:
where measures the impact of a devaluation in country j on competitiveness of country i.
Equilibrium in the goods market of country i implies:
which we can express as 
The exit/no exit game
Let now the policymaker in country i minimize a loss function de…ned over the output gap and in ‡ation (measured by the change in nominal exchange rate). Consistent with the second generation approach, let also a linear term, measuring the cost the policymaker incurs if he chose to exit from the monetary union, be added in the loss function, namely
where y i is the policymaker's output target, i is the in ‡ation aversion coef…cient, C i is the cost of opting out, assumed to be …xed for simplicity, and is a dummy variable de…ned as = 0 if country i remains in the monetary union, so that s 8 Conditional on the realization of a shock that causes deviations of output from its desired level, the policymaker in country i decides to leave or not the monetary union by comparing the welfare losses arising from alternative policy regimes. Thus, the policymaker's problem is to identify the threshold value of the shock at which it is optimal to operate a regime change. As policy decisions are not independent in our model, an interaction between the policymakers optimizing behavior necessarily develops, and this can lead to multiple equilibria and contagion e¤ects across countries.
The solutions to this game arise from strategy pro…les that form a Nash equilibrium. This requires solving …rst the model to obtain the optimal policies and corresponding losses for each country given the strategy followed by the other country, and then …nding the incentive to deviate from it to check if it is or not a Nash equilibrium.
In order to simplify discussion and make mathematical expressions less blurred, we now normalize the output target levels and the nominal …xed parities to one, and assume that the elasticity of aggregate demand to the real exchange rate be the same in the two external countries. Accordingly, henceforth we setỹ
The structure of the game identi…es four regimes: no countries exit (regime N ); only country A exits (regime D A ); only country B exits (regime D B ); both countries exit (regime E).
Losses associated to the above regimes are described in the following payo¤ matrix
where L i h denotes the loss for policymaker i in regime h. This matrix can be used to …nd the unique or multiple Nash equilibrium solutions of the game.
These equilibria are stated formally in the following
Proof. The proof is straightforward.
To compute the losses shown in the above matrix, we need the policymakers'problem in all the regimes to be solved. Optimal policies for country i 2 fA; Bg are obtained by minimizing (6) with respect to s i t subject to (5) and = 1 under the Exit option; otherwise s The reaction function for country i is given by 8 < :
and optimal policies in all the regimes are:
; s
Finally, using (8)- (11), (5) and (6), the corresponding losses for country i 2 fA; Bg required to …nd Nash equilibria are given by: 3 Country-speci…c shock and contagion
To investigate the impact of a country-speci…c shock and contagion e¤ects across countries, we now let, with no loss of generality, u B t = 0, u A t v t , and
9 Solving for v t using (12)- (15) we …nd that the threshold values of the shock at which the governments in country A and B are indi¤erent between opting out and remain in the union are:
where
The following proposition summarizes the main implications of the model under a country-speci…c shock.
Proposition 2 Country A exits the monetary union and devalues if and only if v t > v ; both policymakers exit and devalue (contagion) if v t > v .
Proof. Write the incentive to move from one regime to another in a compact form as:
The symmetry hypothesis C A = C B = C is here only to isolate the e¤ect of the shock.
Asymmetries are taken up below under common shocks. 10 Notice that Qs > 1 as long as is smaller than one: the …rst term under the root is larger than one; the second term is always larger than one for admissible values of parameters.
For instance, if a 2 > 0 country A has no incentive to leave the monetary union. Letting u B t = 0, it is easy to check that
v . Therefore, from Proposition 1 and conditions (18)- (21) it follows that:
Proposition 3 (i) Regime E is a Nash equilibrium if and only if a 1 and b 1 are both positive, i.e. v t > v .
(ii) Regime N is a Nash equilibrium if and only if a 2 > 0 and b 2 > 0, i.e.
(iii) Regime D A is a Nash equilibrium if a 2 < 0 and b 1 < 0, i.e. v < v t < v .
(iv) Regime D B is never a Nash equilibrium as it requires b 2 < 0.
The intuition behind this result is simple. When country-speci…c shocks are small enough, no country would …nd it pro…table to opt out and the stability of the monetary union is preserved. By contrast, for large value of the shocks two events can be discerned: 1) a value at which only the country dealing with the shock may …nd it optimal to exit and devalue; 2) a higher value at which both countries optimally choose to exit, so giving rise to contagion. Proposition 2 also makes clear that both multiple equilibria and the (perverse) event where only the country not hit by the shock moves out can never occur.
It is worth noting that the opt-out cost can be considered a factor under the control, at least partially, of the supranational central bank (e.g., the ECB). By considering it endogenous, appropriate changes in C can be used to avoid union break up. We will consider the issue more in details in the next section.
Common shocks and multiple equilibria
We now focus on common shocks and possible asymmetries in the opting out costs between countries. We study the e¤ects of a common shock by setting 
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Solving for u t using (18)- (21), we can identify the following critical values for the shock
12 These values allow us to establish two cases according to the relative size of C A with respect to C B : 1)
C , implying u > u . We refer to the former as the case of no or small asymmetries 13 and to the latter as that of large asymmetries. We describe the e¤ects of a common shock in the following propositions.
11 Some numerical simulations based on the present theoretical framework with large asymmetries and heterogeneity are given in Canofari et al. (2014c) .
12 See Appendix B. 13 Notice that if
, there are thresholds u < u such that:
C , there are thresholds u > u such that:
(ii) if u t 2 (u ; u ), only country B devalue; (iii) if u t > u , both policymakers devalue (Regime E).
Proof. Under u A t = u B t = u t , the alternative regimes can be identi…ed as follows:
Take up the no or small asymmetry case. From Proposition 1 and (19)- (20), we …nd that: a) E is a Nash equilibrium i¤ a 1 and b 1 are both positive, i.e. u t > max (u ; u ) = u ; b) N is a Nash equilibrium i¤ a 2 and b 2 are both positive, i.e. u t < min (u ; u ) = u ; c) D A is never a Nash equilibrium as it would require a 2 and b 1 to be both negative; d) D B is never a Nash equilibrium as it would require a 1 and b 2 to be both negative.
Consider now the large asymmetry case. We can see that: a) E is a Nash equilibrium i¤ a 1 and b 1 are both positive, i.e. u t > max (u ; u ) = u ; b) N is a Nash equilibrium i¤ a 2 and b 2 are both positive, i.e. u t < min (u ; u ) = u ; c) D A is never a Nash equilibrium as it would require a 2 and b 1 to be both negative; d) D B is a Nash equilibrium i¤ a 1 and b 2 are both negative, i.e. u < u t < u . These restrictions make propositions 3 and 4 straightforward.
Notice that under almost symmetry, multiple equilibria can arise when both countries either stay in or exit. Thus, by emphasizing countries differences, asymmetries lead to results that are similar to those found in the country-speci…c shock scenario, as the behavior of the country with the lower opting out cost appear to echo that of a country dealing with an idiosyncratic shock.
We identify a multiple equilibrium region where both countries either stay in or out when structural di¤erences are small between countries (i.e.
the costs of opting out are similar). However, as said, the opting-out costs can be considered policy instruments. In this regard, an appropriately designed policy (cost) could mitigate the danger of multiple equilibria and a EZ breakup. For instance, in Europe, the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program and Quantitative Easing (QE) policies implemented by the ECB may play this role, if the ECB can use them in a discretionary way to a¤ect the countries opting out costs. Similar e¤ects can be also obtained by forward guidance as by, e.g., the famous "whatever it takes" announcement by the ECB-President Mario Draghi in July 2012. 14 Similar insights can also be derived from numerical simulations of a dynamic policy game in an asymmetric monetary union by Neck (2011, 2102) .
Conclusions
This paper applied game theory and a cost-bene…t analysis to study voluntary exits and contagion e¤ects in countries joined to a monetary union. The paper looked at two non-core, or periphery countries of a large monetary union and examined the role of structural asymmetries and strategic interactions in determining the set of equilibrium solutions under both country-speci…c and common shocks.
The main implications are as follows. Country-speci…c shocks are never associated to multiple equilibria under almost symmetry between countries.
If large enough, however, they can beget the country's exit and be trans- [Here Figure A1 ]
The same result obtains letting the value for to vary from 0 to 1=2 by a step of 0:1. Results are available upon request.
Positive values for Q implies Q C < 1. Thus, as Q C is always greater than zero, Q C 2 (0; 1).
